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RACIAL COVENANTS

UNENFORCEABILITY OF RACIAL RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS
Goetz v. Smith; Saunders v. Phillips1
The owner of a 100-acre tract platted and subdivided
it into 100 lots in 1922 and began conveying lots, the deeds
containing restrictive covenants prohibiting "sale, lease,
transfer or permitted occupation of the properties to or
by 'any Negro, Chinaman, Japanese, or person of Negro,
Chinese or Japanese descent' ", with the additional statement that such covenants would be inserted in all deeds
for any land described in the plat. One of the first deeds,
however, conveying 64.8 acres and containing 93 lots, being
two-thirds of the entire tract, did not contain such a covenant; the deeds conveying the remaining lots, with the exception of one, included the covenant.
In Goetz v. Smith, the appellees who were Negroes, had
purchased the 64.8 acre tract intact from the trustees under
the will of the original grantee; the appellants, lot-owners
in the remaining part of the tract, sought to enforce the
restrictive covenants against appellees' tract. The Court
of Appeals affirmed a decree refusing enforcement on the
ground that the restriction did not apply to the appellees'
tract.
In Saunders v. Phillips, the lots involved were in the
remaining part of the tract, and the deed to the original
grantees contained the restrictive covenant set out above.
The Circuit Court had held the restrictions applicable
against the appellant Negro purchasers, on the authority
of Meade v. Dennistone, and had enjoined appellants from
using and occupying the lots purchased. by them. The
Court of Appeals reversed, and held squarely that under
the Racial Restrictive Covenant cases,8 decided by the Supreme Court subsequently to the Circuit Court decision,
judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants based on race
or color was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari.'
Admitting that the facts in the Maryland case could be
differentiated from those in the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals nevertheless held that the Supreme Court did
'62 A. 2d 602 (Md. 1948).
'173 Md. 295, 196 A. 330 (1938) ; see also Scholtes iv. McColgan, 184 Md.
480,41 A. 2d 479 (1945).
, Shelley v. Kraemer, and McGhee t. Sipes, 334 U. S. 1 (1948) ; Hurd v.
Hodge, and Uricolo v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24 (1948).
IPhillips v. Saunders, 69 S. Ct. 938 (1949).
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not base its decision as to the invalidity of such restrictive
covenants upon the particular facts of the cases before it
but upon the broad principle that the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "inhibits judicial enforcement by state courts of restrictive covenants based on
race or color".
The Court therefore brushed aside the argument that
the Negro purchasers bought with knowledge of the restrictions and should be regarded as estopped from contesting
them, saying: "The defendants here, by their action in
doing what the Supreme Court has said they have a right
to do, cannot be estopped from making the defense the
Court has said is valid."
To the further argument that the Supreme Court had
held the restrictive covenants standing alone not to be a
violation of any rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and that therefore no court should hold them judicially unenforceable when there has been a breach, the
Court said curtly: "This argument comes too late. That is
precisely what the Supreme Court decided. . . . We are
not at liberty to decide to the contrary, or to attempt to
whittle away the affect of such decisions by holding that
some of the statements made are dicta. If the Supreme
Court did not mean what it said, or said more than it should,
or what it should not have said, the responsibility is its
and not ours."'
The decisions in the Supreme Court were in cases from
Missouri, Michigan and the District of Columbia, in all of
which the racial restrictive covenants had been sustained
and held enforceable in the lower courts on the authority
of Corrigan v. Buckley.' The facts in the four cases differ
slightly in detail. In the Missouri case, 7 the covenant was
contained in an agreement executed in 1911 between thirty
out of thirty-nine adjoining property owners and restricted
for 50 years use or occupancy, as owners or tenants, "by
people of the Negro or Mongolian Race"; the Negro purchasers bought without actual knowledge of the restriction.
In the Michigan case 8 the restriction was against use or
occupancy "by any person or persons except those of the
Caucasian race", was contained in a contract, subsequently
recorded, executed by the then owner of the property,
was limited in duration, and was not to become effective
unless 80% of the property in the block was subjected to
8

Supra, n. 1, 603.
6271 U. S.323 (1926).
' Shelley v. Kraemer, supra,n. 3.
8
McGhee v. Sipes, supra,n. 3.
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similar restrictions. In the District of Columbia cases,'
twenty of thirty-one lots in a city block had been sold in
1906, each subject to a covenant that it should "never be
rented, leased, sold, transferred or conveyed unto any
Negro or colored person, under a penalty of Two Thousand
Dollars ($2,000), which shall be a lien against said property"; there was no time limitation on the restriction; the
remaining eleven lots in the block, all the lots being on the
same side of the street, had been occupied by Negroes for
some twenty years.
In the two cases from State courts, the Supreme Court
held unanimously (a) that the rights of ownership, use
and occupancy of property are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment; (b)" that judicial enforcement of restrictive
covenants is state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and violates the guarantee of equal
protection of the laws; (c) that as long as there is voluntary
adherence to such covenants, no state action is involved
and the Fourteenth Amendment is not operative, but the
purpose of the covenants may not be attained by judicial
action enforcing their terms just as it may not be attained
by legislative action. In Corrigan v. Buckley"0 the only
constitutional issue raised in the lower courts, and therefore the only question before the Supreme Court on appeal,
related to the validity of the private agreements as such;
that case neither considered nor adjudicated the validity
of court enforcement of the restrictions contained in such
agreements. To the contention that there was no denial
of equal protection since the State courts stood equally
ready to enforce restrictive covenants excluding white
persons from ownership or occupancy of property covered
by the agreement, the Court pointed out that no case
had been cited, in which a court, State or Federal, had
been asked to enforce such a covenant and went on to say:
"But there are more fundamental considerations. The
rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The
rights established are personal rights. It is, therefore, no
answer to these petitioners to say that the courts may also
be induced to deny white persons rights of ownership
and occupancy on grounds of race or color. Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities."' 1
0Hurd

,v.
Hodge, and Uricolo v. Hodge, supra, n. 3.

10Supra, n. 6.

"1Asomewhat similar contention was made unsuccessfully In Buchanan
v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917), which was, however, decided on due
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In the cases from the District of Columbia, the Supreme
Court, passing over the constitutional questions argued as
unnecessary to consider, held that judicial enforcement
by the Federal courts of racial restrictive covenants embodied in private agreements would be governmental action prohibited by the Civil Rights Act, 2 and said further
that even in the absence of the statute such enforcement
would be contrary to the public policy of the United States
"as manifested in the Constitution, treaties, federal statutes
and applicable legal precedents." Justice Frankfurter, in
a concurring opinion, felt it was sufficient to say that,
equitable relief being discretionary, it should not be granted
by a Federal court where similar relief from State courts
would violate the Constitution.
The rulings of the Supreme Court in these cases profoundly changed what had become an accepted part of real
property law during the last three decades. They ended
the chapter of a line of decisions which developed in the
state courts mainly, and which had attempted to reconcile
racial restrictions against sale and occupancy of land with
the basic common law rule of property requiring freedom
of alienation. The Supreme Court here held that the state
and federal courts had misinterpreted the effect and scope
of its prior holding on racial restrictive covenants in Corrigan v. Buckley, which for twenty-two years had been
relied upon by the courts as authority for their position
that judicial enforcement of such covenants did not violate
the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Racial restrictive covenants are of comparatively recent
origin and represent an innovation in the property law
governing restrictions on the use of land. Developed at
the beginning of this century, they spread widely after
1917. In that year, the Supreme Court in Buchanan V.
Warley 8 declared a municipal ordinance, prohibiting white
process grounds. Cf. Plessy v. Ferguson. 163 U. S. 537 (1896) and Missouri,
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938). It has been pointed out
that although the Court in the Shelley case did not consider the contentions raised as to denial of due process, the reasons assigned for holding
the judicial action involved to be a denial of equal protection would be

equally applicable to the due process clause.

Tussman and ten Brook.

The Equal Protection,of the LawR (1949), 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 362.

12R. S., see. 1978; 8 U. S. C. A., sec. 42. Section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, c. 31, re-enacted in sec. 18 of the Act. of May 31.
1870, 16 Stat. 144, c. 114. provides: "All citizens of the United States sball
have the same right, In every 'State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white
citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and
personal property."
11Supra, n. 11, 82. "We think this attempt to prevent an alienation of
property In question to a person of color was not a legitimate exercise
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persons from living in Negro districts and Negroes from
living in white districts, unconstitutional as in direct violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thereafter, property
owners turned to restrictive covenants to achieve by private action the residential segregation which the Supreme
Court had held could not be effected by legislative act. The
Maryland Court of Appeals declared in 1938: "Since the
decisions under the Fourteenth Amendment no public action can be taken to solve what has become a problem,
and property owners have undertaken to regulate it by
contract."' 4 With one exception," all the racial covenant
cases in the State courts were decided after Buchanan v.
Warley. 6

These racial covenants, conditions, or agreements were
sometimes inserted in the deeds conveying property, so
as to be controlled by the rules relating to covenants running with the land. More often, written agreements between a group of neighboring property owners were used,
these being then officially recorded 7 so as to give due
notice to all subsequent purchasers. The courts, as in Maryland, then recognized such agreements as creating an easement in each property affected which inured to the benefit,
not only of the parties but as well of their heirs, personal
representatives or assigns, enforceable in equity against
one who subsequently dealt with one of the properties
covered thereby, with notice, actual or constructive.18 Some
courts, in recognition of the rule against perpetuities and
the distinction between partial and total restraints on
alienation, limited them in duration, while others allowed
them to be perpetual.
of the power of the State, and is in direct violation of the fundamental
law enacted in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution preventing
state interference with property rights except by due process of law." The
Supreme Court twice thereafter held segregation ordinances invalid in
Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U. S. 668 (1927), and City of Richmond v. Deans,
281 U. S. 704 (1930).
"Supra, n. 2, 301.
' Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641
(1915).
'e See McGovney, Racial Residential Segregation by State Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants or Conditions in Deeds is Unconstitutional (1945) 33 Calif. L. Rev. 5. In the relatively early Federal
case of Gandolfo ,v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (C. C. Cal. 1892), racial restrictive covenants in a deed were held void and unenforceable both as ,violative
of the equal protection clause and as in contravention of treaty proivisions
with China.
"7It was held in Meade v. Dennistone, supra, n. 2, 308 that the Maryland
statutes, requiring deeds conveying an estate of inheritance or freehold
or any declaration or limitation of use, or any estate for sefven years, to
be executed, acknowledged and recorded as therein profvided, were applicable to grants or covenants for easements in land and that racial restrictive
agreements required recording to put purchasers on notice,
8Meade v. Dennistone, supra, n, 2,
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The instant cases and those in the Supreme Court show
the variations of the pattern. In the Supreme Court, in
both the Michigan and Missouri cases, the covenants ran
for a limited time, were not inserted in the deeds of the
immediate grantees, and restricted occupancy alone; in
the District of Columbia cases the covenants were not
limited in time and restricted sale, lease, rental, or transfer.
In the instant Maryland cases, only one of the deeds to
the Negro immediate grantees contained the covenant,
which was unlimited in duration and restricted both sale
and occupancy. In the Supreme Court cases, although the
issues were confined to restriction against sale and occupancy by persons of Negro descent, the Supreme Court in
a footnote" to the decision remarked that such covenants
are not infrequently against others than Negroes, such as
Indians, Jews, Chinese, Japanese, Mexicans, Hawaiians,
Puerto Ricans, and Filipinos; the covenant in the Michigan
case restricted from occupancy everyone but members of
the Caucasian race, and in the instant Maryland cases the
restrictive agreement extended to persons of Negro, Chinese and Japanese descent.2 0
When the covenants were broken by willing sellers and
lessors, the courts acted to enforce the restrictive terms
of the agreement. Meeting the defense that such covenants
contravened the common law rule against restraints on
alienation, the courts divided on the issue. The majority
of the state courts and the District of Columbia upheld
racial restrictions on sale and/or occupancy as valid ;21 in
the Supreme Court cases, the Missouri and the District
of Columbia courts had so held. The remaining jurisdictions held that restrictions against sale or lease were totally
void as restraints on alienation, as tending to take property
out of commerce, but that restrictions on use and occupancy were valid.2 2 The latter view was that taken by the
" Shelley v. Kraemer, supra,n. 3, f. n. 26.
2DOne
of the immediate grantees claimed to be an American Indian, hut
was found by the trial Court to be a Negro.
21 See Wyatt v. Adair, 215 Ala. 363, 110 So. 801 (1926); Chandler v.
Ziegler, 88 Colo. 1, 291 Pac. 822 (1930) ; Hurd v. lodge, 162 F. 2d 283
(1947) Dooley v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 199 Ga. 353, 34 S. E. 2d
(1945)
Lee v. Hansberry, 372 Ill. 369, 24 N. E. 2d 37 (1939); Clark v.
Vaughan, 131 Kan. 438, 292 Pac. 783 (1930) ; Queensborough Land Co. v.
Cazeaux, qupra, n. 15: Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S. W. 217
(1918) ; Ridgway v. Cockburn, 296 N. Y. Supp. 936 (1937) ; Vernon x. R. J.
Reynolds Realty Co., 226 N. C. 58, 36 S. E. 2d 710 (1946); Lyons v.
Wallen, 191 Okl. 567, 133 P. 2d 555 (1942).
See Los Angeles Invest. Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596 (1919)
Meade v. Dennistone, 8upra, n. 2; Porter ,v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 206
N. W. 532 (1925) ; Perkins v. Trustees of Monroe Avenue Church, 79 Ohio
App. 457, 70 N. E. 2d 487 (1946), appeal dismissed 147 Ohio St. 537, 72 N. E.
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Maryland Court of Appeals, which said in Meade v. Dennistone: "The rules against restraints on alienation were
only intended to make conveyancing free and unrestrained,
and had nothing to do with use and occupancy. "23
In those jurisdictions upholding racial restrictions on
sale, the relief obtainable from the courts included a
decree in equity declaring the deeds of the immediate
grantees null and void, revesting title in their immediate
grantor, and restraining future sale to members of the
restricted group. Such, for example, was the decree below
in the District of Columbia cases in the Supreme Court;
and in the Missouri case, although the restriction at issue
was solely on use and occupancy, the State Supreme Court,
pursuant to the common law policy of that state as formulated in earlier decisions, interpreted breach of the covenant as requiring entry of a judgment divesting title out
of the petitioners and revesting title in the immediate
grantor or such other person as the trial court might direct.
The customary form of relief granted in those states limiting validity to restrictions on use and occupancy was an
injunction restraining use and occupancy. If the grantees
had gone into possession, the courts customarily issued
orders for removal within 60 to 90 days, and enjoined future
rentals to and occupancy by members of the prohibited
group. Such injunctions, supported by the contempt powers
of the courts, usually resulted in the eviction of the nonCaucasian occupants. Some covenants provided liquidated
damages for breach of the contract, as in the District of
Columbia cases where two thousand dollars ($2,000) was
the stipulated sum; however, damages were neither sought
nor given.
Occasionally, courts have withheld judicial enforcement
of covenants if the character of the restricted area had
so changed that to grant enforcement would have been
inequitable. 4 The Maryland Court of Appeals recognized
the soundness of this policy, in Meade v. Dennistone, but
held there that the occupancy by Negroes of one house in
a city block had effected no such change in the neighborhood as to justify a court of equity in relieving the parties
of the burden of their agreement.2 5
2d 97 (1947); White v. White, 108 W. Va. 128, 150 S. E. 531 (1929)
Doherty v. Rice, 240 Wis. 389, 3 N. W. 2d 734 (1942). See also Re Wren
(Ont.) 4 D. L. R. 674 (1945).
Supra, n. 2, 335.
214 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, sec. 406, comment n. (1944). See, e.g.
Hundley v. Gorewitz, 13 F. 2d (App. D. C. 1942); Fairchild r. Raines,
24 Cal. 2d 818, 151 P. 2d 260 (1944) ; Clark fv. Vaughan, 131 Kan. 438,
292 Pac. 783 (1930).
2USupra, n. 2, 307-09.
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The rationale of the decisions in the State courts which
upheld racial covenants in their various forms has been,
in brief, that such restraints were in the social interest and
therefore reasonable, "outweighing" the requirements of
the common law doctrines of alienability. Thus; it is stated
in the American Law Institute Restatement of Property:
"In states where the social conditions render desirable the exclusion of the racial or social group involved from the area in question, the restraint is
reasonable and hence valid .... The avoidance of unpleasant racial and social relations and the stabilization of the value of the land which results from the
enforcement of the exclusion policy are regarded as
outweighing the evils which normally result from
a curtailment of the power of alienation .... The most
important factor in solving this problem is the public
opinion of the state where the land is located.... 2 6
The Restatement thus regarded the public policy of a
given state as the controlling factor in determining whether
racial restrictive covenants were or were not reasonable
restraints on alienation and enforceable. The Maryland
Court of Appeals had, of course, ruled, prior to the instant
cases that racial restrictive covenants were not against the
public policy of the state of Maryland.2 7 The decision in
the instant cases makes no statement to the contrary. As
a practical matter, however, it would seem that this may
well be the actual result of the Court's holding that such
covenants are not judicially enforceable. 8
" 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, sec. 406, comment 1 (1944) ;italics supplied.

Meade v. Dennistone, supra,n. 2, 309.
support of the contention that such covenants should be regarded
as against public policy, it has been argued that they had developed through
"an uncritical distortion of the doctrines concerning restrictions on the use
of property"; that the concept of use restrictions before their development
had been, and with their sole exception still is, In terms of type of structure
or activity on the land and not in terms of ownership or occupancy; that
they bore no reasonable relationship to the public welfare, for which reason
legislative action seeking to effect segregation had been declared unconstitutional; that on the contrary they were harmful to society, in that their
effect is to hem proscribed races in ghettoes, create great overcrowding
and congestion, extend and aggravate slum conditions with resultant increase In disease, crime, vice and racial tension with concomitant high cost
to the community of police, health and fire protection and a heavier relief
burden. See briefs for petitioners In McGhee v. Sipes, and Hurd v. Hodges,
supra, n. 3, and CLARK and PERLMAN, PREJUDICE AND PROPERTY (brief submitted for the United States as am icus curiae in the Supreme Court cases).
76-80 (1948). It is interesting to note that in Canada, such a covenant
was held to be against public policy in Re Wren, supra, n. 22, the court
pointing to the declaration against racial discrimination contained In the
Charter of the United Nations to which Canada was a signatory and to
the Ontario Racial Discrimination Act.
28In
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There has been much speculation since the Supreme
Court decisions as to their exact scope, and as to how far
if at all they may be circumvented.2 9 Would, for example,
a suit for damages be maintainable against one selling or
leasing in violation of a racial restrictive covenant, especially where as in Hurd v. Hodges a liquidated damage
clause is contained in the agreement?" If title to the land
involved is put in a corporation or club, with the residents
simply owning shares of stock or club membership for the
transfer of which approval by other stockholders or members, or by a specified board or committee, is required,
could racial restrictions be effectively imposed?3 '
To the extent that such plans, or variations of them,
would require resort to the courts to make them effective,
most commentators have regarded them as being equally
as impotent to achieve their aims as was.the racial restrictive covenant, and for the same reasons. More questionable
would seem to be the situation where a Negro plaintiff,
buying or renting property covered by a racial restrictive
covenant, seeks performance of his contract. Even here,
however, it could be readily argued that refusal of a decree
in such a case would be merely indirectly enforcing judicially the covenant which the court could not constitutionally enforce directly.
In general, the conclusion seems inescapable that racial
restrictive covenants have, as a practical matter, been eliminated as effective means of controlling either the transfer
or the use and occupation of land, by virtue of having
been stripped of their enforceability. The Supreme Court's
affirmance of the validity of such covenants as private
agreements does not serve to alter the result. A property
right incapable of enforcement would seem of little value,
if indeed it can be regarded as a right at all. 2
2See,
e.g., Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment:
The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 203 (1949) ; Restrictive Covenants and Equitable Protection-theNew Rule in Shelley's Case,
21 So. Calif. L. Rev. 358 (1948) ; State Action Reconsidered in the Light of
Shelley v. Kraemer, 48 Col. L. R. 1241 (1948) ; Note, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1450
(1948) ; Note, 3 A. L. R. 2d 466, 473 (1949).
10In cases prior to Shelley v. Kraemer, it had been held that a suit for
damages would lie;. see Chandler v. Ziegler, 8upra, n. 21; Eason v. Buffaloe,
198 N. C. 520, 152 S. E. 496 (1930).
8, Cf. Tudor Arms Apartments v. Shaffer, 62 A. 2d 346 (Md. 1948), as to
the status of purchasers of stock under a co-operative apartment plan,
title to the property being technically in the apartment corporation.
12 Cases from California, Ohio, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, and New
York decided subsequently to Shelley v. Kraemer are collected In -Note, 3
A. L. R. 2d 466, 471 (1949), in which, as in the instant cases, racial restrictLve covenants were ruled unenforceable; these, however, all ivolved
direct enforcement by injunction.

